2 recreational and therapeutic drug legalization, decriminalization, availability, and screening; 3 protective helmets 1 See generally infra Section VII. 2 See, e.g., Sorell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., for the plurality) (" [W] hen a state entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands."); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988) (rejecting a paternalistic justification of a regulation of charitable solicitation speech); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 649 (9th Cir. 2016) (heightened judicial scrutiny for commercial speech regulations as a mechanism to "check raw paternalism"); Dana's RR. Supply v. Attorney General, 807 F.3d 1235, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Paternalistic efforts at social engineering are anathema to constitutional first principles."); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (addressing commercial speech regulations "that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good" (quoting Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503)); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 87 (Cal. 2013) (constitutional skepticism regarding the "paternalistic 'assumption that the public will respond "irrationally" to the truth'" (quoting Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503)). More broadly, see Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 587-606 (2004) . 3 See, e.g., Taylor 5 workplace regulation and disability; 6 selection of a conservator or guardian; 7 smoking in public parks 8 and smokeless tobacco in specific public venues; 9 sugar content in some http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vermont-marijuana-idUSKCN0WG13X (proposal as still prohibiting consumers from growing plants at home, along with imposing a 25% sales tax). 4 See, e.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F. 163 (2000) ). 6 See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73, 85 (2002) (the ADA (disability) statute as intended to combat "workplace paternalism"); Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (to similar effect). 7 See, e.g., DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 128 A.3d 901, 907-11 (Conn. 2016) (discussing the role and limits of explicitly considering the "best interests," as well as any expressed preferences, of the relevant party in appointing a conservator or guardian). 8 Discussions of the proper role of legal paternalism have long focused on competing fundamental principles, perhaps followed by attempts to apply such fundamental principles in particular contexts and cases. 17 This Article suggests, however, that we are entering into a period in which debate over fundamental principles regarding legal paternalism will gradually go into eclipse, and attention to various narrower, more detailed problems of practical and contextualized application will increase in prominence. This Article does not endorse or oppose any version of legal paternalism or libertarianism. Rather, its purpose is to question the current practical significance of any broadly principled endorsement of or opposition to legal paternalism.
This Article begins by briefly illustrating some typical understandings of the idea of paternalism, particularly in legal contexts, 18 and more broadly legitimize the perhaps objectionable further exchange of some good or service. along with closely associated ideas of personal autonomy, 19 and initially addresses the diminishing significance of matters of basic principle in contemporary discussions of legal paternalism. 20 The increasing number and variety of distinct understandings of both legal paternalism and autonomy require debate over preliminary issues of definition before any principle can be applied in any context.
21
Four additional major factors then jointly help to account for the eclipse of basic principle in contemporary discussions of legal paternalism. First, the underlying grounds and logic of the most traditionally crucial form of autonomy have, to many current observers, increasingly seemed suspect. 22 As belief in this fullest and most crucial sense of autonomy gradually fades, the most important broadly principled grounds for objecting to legal paternalism must eventually fade with it. 23 Problems of practical implementation, of circumstance, and of particular context then naturally loom larger.
Second, our health insurance, health care systems, and other relevant institutions continue to evolve in broadly social, more intensively collective, less individualized directions. 24 Against this background, any distinction between self-regarding conduct that affects the actor and other-regarding conduct that affects unconsenting third parties becomes increasingly blurry, shifting, and even arbitrary.
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As the self-versus other-regarding conduct distinction continues to blur, the realm of justified paternalism may tend to expand or to narrow, but more crucially, to blur in many contexts, even into unworkability and incoherence. 26 Where the crucial boundary lines become increasingly blurred, the real significance of any related basic principle is thereby unavoidably reduced. 22 See infra Section III. 23 See id. 24 See infra Section IV. 25 See id. 26 See id. 27 See id.
Third, the proper scope of legal paternalism is increasingly seen as a matter not so much of basic principle, or the clash of opposing basic principles, but of the accumulating evidence and significance of cognitive and other biases, fallacies, pathologies, and systematic irrationalities in decision making. 28 Such evidence of systematic bias applies not merely to the decision making of generally competent adult decision makers in their personal capacity, but in some forms to government officials and government bodies in a position to adopt, implement, or reject legally paternalistic policies. 29 The case for legal paternalism thus increasingly depends not on broad principle, but on contextualized comparisons of degrees and forms of various personal and institutional biases and irrationalities. 30 Fourth, and more broadly, the number, variety, and significance of conceptual, statistical, and evidentiary complications has increased the frequency with which the cases for and against legal paternalism turn not on basic principles, but on just such complex, particularized, technical considerations. 31 Human intentions, competencies, and values are complex matters, as are the various actual results of many anti-paternalistic policies. 32 Such complications may often be difficult to work through in advance. But we cannot responsibly resolve today's questions of legal paternalism primarily by appeal to any purported basic principles, while downplaying crucially relevant, if also murkier and more arid, technical complications.
The force of all of these considerations is then illustrated below in a controversial subject matter area one might think most likely to be governed by disputes over basic principle: that of assisted suicide and related emerging statutory and case law. 33 Even in the controversial assisted suicide context, however, it turns out that the debates decreasingly reflect conflicting basic principles, and increasingly reflect the narrower subtleties, complications, and uncertainties inherent in the various relevant technical issues.
34 28 See infra Section V. 29 See id. 30 See id. 31 See infra Section VI. 32 See id. 33 See infra Section VII. 34 See generally id.
I. VARIETIES OF LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE CONFLICTING MEANINGS OF AUTONOMY
The ideas of paternalism in general, and of paternalism in the legal realm in particular, are notoriously difficult to pin down. 35 It has been said that "there are as many competing conceptions of paternalism as there are authors . . . ." 36 This Article will therefore not commit to any specific definition of paternalism, or of legal paternalism in particular, to the exclusion of other mainstream definitions. A merely general understanding of the concept of paternalism will instead allow for more comprehensive conclusions. A sufficient sense of the idea of paternalism, as well as of some of the important conceptual conflicts, can be drawn from a brief survey of some prominent attempts at a definition of paternalism.
One recent survey of definitions of paternalism, for example, finds three more or less standard components. 37 These three components are said to involve, respectively, interference with individual freedom, an intention to promote the good of the individual interfered with, and the absence of consent by the person whose freedom is to be interfered with. 38 These may initially seem to be uncontroversial considerations. But it is not clear, for example, that putting a bequest in a trust, with paternalistic restrictions, 39 or paternalistically hiding one's own potentially dangerous prescription drug, 40 interferes with the freedom or autonomy of the person who is being treated paternalistically.
As well, some paternalistic laws, as in the case of prohibiting the commercial manufacture of recreational alcohol, are clearly intended to benefit not the regulated would-be manufacturer, but the eventual consumer of alcohol. 41 There are also cases in which the affected party welcomes and consents to a paternalistic legal regulation, perhaps for fear that its current will to follow its own most fundamental goals would otherwise weaken over time.
42
One of the leading writers in this area, Professor Gerald Dworkin, defines paternalism as the "interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm." 43 For our purposes, we again need not object to this or any other reasonable formulation, but Dworkin's formulation raises new and additional controversies. 44 Among such controversies is whether to define paternalism in normatively unattractive or more neutral terms. 45 where the paternalizer acts without knowledge of individual's will or where the individual has "no will"). Professor Dworkin, it should be noted, also refers to regulatory actions taken merely "without the consent" of the person being treated paternalistically. See Dworkin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at Section 2. 52 Gert & Culver, The Justification of Paternalism, supra note 48, at 199 (the paternalistic act as undertaken "independently" of any possible past, present, or future consent by the party being treated paternalistically); see also, e.g., Groll, supra note 51, at 698. 53 Professor Groll refers to this as the "Accidental Concordance" problem. See Groll, supra note 51, at 698. 54 Another leading theorist, Professor Joel Feinberg, suggests that legal paternalism "justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm, then face an expanding array of conceptual problems and complications.
First among such conceptual complications, we must ask whether paternalism must be targeted at steering someone's behavior-at that person doing or not doing something-or whether paternalism can be aimed merely at promoting someone's desired state of mind or belief. 55 Can there be, for example, genuinely paternalistic government manipulation merely of attitudes or beliefs, and not of anyone's behavior?
Second, we must ask whether paternalism is more a matter of the intent of the person acting paternalistically, or instead of some effect on the person being treated paternalistically. 56 A serious complication for legal paternalism in particular is that legislating bodies may have no ascertainable single intent in imposing a rule. 57 Intent can be multiple, vague, unascertainable, or even self-contradictory. 58 To the extent that we cannot determine a multi-member legislative body's distinct primary intent, the existence of any intent necessary for legal paternalism will be unclear. 59 Third, we must ask whether a government in particular could treat the public paternalistically, and perhaps disrespectfully, even in the course of addressing the public solely with unthreatening and or in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good." Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 105 (1971) [hereinafter Feinberg, Legal Paternalism] . Professor Feinberg thus assumes, controversially, that legal paternalism, if not paternalism more generally, must involve coercion, thereby excluding a range of state nudges, incentives, mild inducements, and publicity campaigns insofar as they fall short of coercion. See id. We here set aside any problems in distinguishing avoiding harms and promoting one's good. 55 purely rational arguments. 60 We might well think of rational argumentation as the very opposite of paternalism. 61 But, could rational argumentation ever take on a paternalistic character? 62 Consider, for example, a government's tedious, unrelenting, time-and-attentionconsuming, and perhaps distracting campaign for some behavioral change, conducted in rational but demeaning and patronizing logical steps and language. 63 Fourth, we must ask about the many cases in which the effects of the policy or rule in question are apparently mixed, in the sense that they are to some degree paternalistic, and to some degree nonpaternalistic. 64 In a typical such case, a legal prohibition may be intended to somehow benefit both the person being treated paternalistically and, to one degree or another, other non-consenting persons affected by the conduct of the party being treated paternalistically. 65 We shall see below 66 that even if the classic distinction between selfregarding actions and other-regarding actions, however subtly qualified or interpreted, was ever useful, under our current regulatory circumstances, the distinction is now typically useless.
Fifth, we must ask whether any viable distinction can be drawn between paternalism that affects or is intended to affect the ends, goals, values, and priorities held by the person being treated paternalistically, and paternalism that affects-entirely or primarily-the means chosen by that person in pursuing their ends, goals, values, and priorities. 67 To simplify a bit, can a distinction be maintained between paternalism toward a person's ends and paternalism toward that person's means? 68 Sixth and finally, we must consider the murky and evolving relationships between paternalism on the one hand and various forms of autonomy on the other. 69 It is often assumed that some form of autonomy, and the value of autonomy, are central to an understanding of paternalism and its permissible role.
70 Paternalism is often assumed to limit autonomy. 71 It might well be that paternalism can restrict autonomy in one respect while increasing it in another respect. 72 Often, though, it is said that paternalism is wrong when it violates or interferes with the autonomy of the person being treated paternalistically.
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Discussions of paternalism, taken collectively, thus involve more than one distinct sense of the idea of autonomy. 74 Our notions of autonomy have evolved over time. 75 Crucially, for our purposes the particular sense of the idea of autonomy at stake in any discussion of paternalism often partially determines the nature, content, and outcome of that discussion.
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VI. An additional, equally murky distinction is sometimes attempted between paternalism that affects the welfare, well-being, or happiness of the person being treated paternalistically, and paternalism that affects only the moral status or moral character of that person. See Dworkin, supra note 21, at Section 2.5. We also mainly set aside issues of so-called self-paternalism and voluntary precommitment. See In the past, discussions of paternalism and of its proper role have tended to focus on matters of basic principle only when autonomyin what we will below call the fullest sense-is at stake. 77 When autonomy in a more modest sense is the only form of autonomy thought to be at stake in a given context, discussions of autonomy's proper role typically then focus less on issues of basic principle, and more on matters such as detailed empirical evidence, subtle conceptual analysis, and complex calculations and balancing. 78 Our thesis in this regard is that autonomy in the fullest sense is gradually losing its credibility and appeal with today's theorists and decision makers, leaving only more modest, less ambitious forms of autonomy in play. This tendency means that discussions of paternalism will increasingly focus on matters of detailed, contextualized, and particularized investigation, rather than appeal to basic principles.
Very roughly, autonomy in the fullest, most ambitious sense focuses on the idea of a will that is capable of genuine agency.
79 Such a will is capable of being moved by apparently good and bad reasons, including principles.
80 Such a will would crucially differ from a will that is instead moved by any combination of internal or external physical causes, including random physical events of the sort investigated by the sciences. 81 A will that reflects merely some combination of randomness, current or past bodily or physical circumstances, and any set of biological or other physical laws, would thus not qualify as autonomous in the fullest sense.
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Even at this point, we can begin to sense why autonomy in the fullest sense might be more closely linked to basic principles, to fundamental values, and to the idea of inviolability than autonomy in a lesser sense. Autonomy in the fullest sense is historically linked to writers such as Immanuel Kant lesser sense may, in the end, reduce to something like the absence of some disfavored set of socially-imposed or psychological obstacles to attaining what we desire. Autonomy in a lesser sense tends to be more broadly political than metaphysical. The value of autonomy in such a lesser sense may, at bottom, reflect merely something like a preference for some particular causes of our decisions, and for non-frustration over the experience of frustration.
Not surprisingly, then, the nature and status of autonomy has of late been widely discussed.
85 Autonomy in a lesser, mostly social or political sense, akin to valued social and political freedom, is doubt- 85 less central to much of our most important constitutional jurisprudence. 86 Given the overall variety of meanings of both paternalism and autonomy, it is not surprising that there is some uncertainty as to the relationships in legal practice between paternalism and autonomy. 87 But as a first approximation, paternalism and autonomy have been thought to commonly conflict in ways classically noted by Wilhelm von Humboldt, 88 John Stuart Mill, 89 and by contemporary writers. 90 Crucially, the significance we attach to any relationship between paternalism and autonomy will depend not only on context, but on whether we believe that autonomy in the fullest sense is at stake, or only autonomy in some less ambitious sense. Adopting the idea of autonomy in the fullest sense, as developed by writers such 86 as Immanuel Kant, 91 may well lead some persons to endorse a basic principle directly limiting or even precluding paternalism in a broad range of cases. Autonomy in a lesser sense that is typically focused on particular favored and disfavored causes of action and barriers to action, however, tends to neither support nor oppose paternalism as a matter of principle. Autonomy in this lesser sense tends to appear only as one consideration among others in discussions of the proper role of paternalism.
The claim that autonomy in the fullest, Kantian sense is real and viable and is often at stake in typical cases has recently come under attack. 92 As we see immediately below, it is increasingly thought that anything like full Kantian autonomy depends upon unsupported metaphysical claims and bad science. 93 Given this erosion of belief in full Kantian autonomy, we should expect the idea of autonomy to gradually play a more limited role in discussion of legal paternalism, rather than a role at the level of broad principle. These trends are illustrated in Section III below.
II. KANTIAN FULL AUTONOMY, ITS CONTEMPORARY CRITICS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF AUTONOMY AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
Immanuel Kant was not the first writer to emphasize human autonomy in a robust sense, or to link autonomy to the most fundamental sense of human dignity. 94 Kant's discussion of autonomy serves well, however, in illustrating how our understanding of autonomy is today becoming increasingly diluted and less deeply meaningful. In particular, Kant ing a person as his own "maker and molder" and as able to "have that which he chooses and to be that which he wills").
just as natural necessity is a property characterizing the causality of all non-rational beings . . . .
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Autonomy is in turn crucially "the ground of the dignity of human nature" 96 in the most fundamental sense in which dignity is relevant to questions of paternalism. 97 The exercise of Kantian autonomy, the ground of fundamental dignity, is thus incompatible with decision making that results from any combination of randomness and natural or physical causation. ("What else then can freedom of will be but autonomy-that is, the property which will has of being a law to itself?"); see also id. at 116 ("Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien [including biological] influences."). 96 Id. at 103; see also is said to be grounded in their autonomy of will . . . ."); see also GUYER, supra note 96, at 9 (stating that, for Kant, "autonomy has a dignity that is incomparable to the value we place on any particular object of desire . . . ."); Thomas May, The Concept of Autonomy, 31 AM. PHIL. Q. 133, 133 (1994) ("Since . . . Immanuel Kant, autonomy has become nearly synonymous with human dignity and an imminent value in any system which purports to take seriously respect for persons."). 98 For discussion, see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 25 (1996) ("The will is the causality of a rational being. If the will's . . . decisions are determined by the laws of nature, it is not a free [or autonomous] will."); THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 29 (1991) [hereinafter HILL, AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT] ("To have a will is to be able to cause events in accord with principles . . . .To have autonomy it is also necessary that one's will be free in a negative sense. This implies that one is capable of causing events without being causally determined to do so.") (emphasis omitted). Free will and autonomy for Kant thus require that the will be able "to act in complete independence of any prior or concurrent causes other than our own will or practical reasoning . . Typically, but not exclusively, 99 of late, the credibility of this robust Kantian sense of autonomy has been called into serious question, or indeed decisively rejected. 100 An important element of this trend toward abandoning full Kantian autonomy has been the increasing popularity, particularly among scientists and philosophers of science, of one version or another of what we might call physicalism or materialism.
101 Materialism in this sense maintains that while there may seem to be non-material or non-physical things such as conscious minds, continuing selves, thoughts, relationships, loves, morals, and psychologies, everything is in reality either physical or inescapably dictated by the physical.
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Our concern herein is of course not with the truth or falsity of materialism or any related doctrine, 103 but with one effect of the gradually increasing prominence of materialism. Thus, leading philosopher Thomas Nagel reports that "among the scientists and philosophers who . . . express views about the natural order as a whole, 110 "a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules,"
111 "complex biological machines," 112 or to a multiplicity of "mindless robots." 113 If we are ultimately reducible to any of these entities, or to any combination thereof, one implication is that autonomy in anything like the robust Kantian sense becomes unattainable and indeed meaningless. As the contemporary physicist Carlo Rovelli asks, "what does it mean, our being free to make decisions, if our behavior does nothing but follow the predetermined laws of nature?" 114 One answer to Professor Rovelli's question is to concede that such a view indeed lets the air out of the balloon of free will, robust autonomy, and other typically valued capacities. 115 Another is to try to draw a meaningful line between causes that are operating outside and inside the cranium, with only the latter somehow offering the possibility of freedom. 116 Yet another is, in full accordance with the laws of nature, to endorse some of our desires and not others, in accordance with an ordering or hierarchy of desires somehow naturally arrived at. 117 Finally, one could set aside any interest in autonomy in a Kantian sense, and reduce the idea of autonomy to the level of society and politics.
118 Some natural, materialist causes of our choices and behavior could then be largely taken for granted, while some other such causes, deemed to be within the broad realm of politics, could be judged to promote, respect, undermine, or violate our autonomy, 114 , 2 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 3, 6 (2011) (discussing a possible "regress problem" in creating a "hierarchy of desires"). For another "hierarchy" approach to autonomy, see DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY, supra note 85, at 108 ("I am defining autonomy as the capacity to reflect upon one's motivational structure and to make changes in that structure."). 118 See Veljko Dubljevic, Autonomy in Neuroethics: Political and Not Metaphysical, 4 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 44, 44 (2013) (echoing the shift in John Rawls's interest from metaphysical to political accounts of justice).
in whatever sense of the idea of autonomy remained. 119 The idea of autonomy would thus refer not to, say, the absence of barriers and constraints on choosing in general, but to the absence of some or all barriers and constraints that we somehow think of as social or broadly political.
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For our purposes, however, the key point is that if we abandon reliance on the full Kantian sense of autonomy, we should expect that the sacrifices and tradeoffs we are willing to make on matters of legal paternalism and autonomy will eventually be affected. We can certainly define ideas such as autonomy, freedom, and dignity as we wish. But on some definitions, it eventually becomes unclear why we should be willing to pay any substantial price to uphold autonomy as thus understood. At some point, autonomy in a diluted, non-Kantian sense is no longer able to draw upon the argumentative logic, depth, and weight of its Kantian ancestor. 121 And at that point, debates over paternalism are steered not by accepting or rejecting autonomy as a basic principle, but by a variable mix of contextual and other non-basic considerations, with a diluted conception of autonomy appearing merely as one among many such considerations.
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As it turns out, and as we explore below, the role of principle in debates over paternalism is also being further reduced for independent reasons. In particular, the evolving nature of an increasingly interdependent and increasingly interactive society has continually eroded any workable distinction between actions that affect the actor and consenting parties, and actions that affect unconsenting third parties. We briefly consider the continuing eclipse of any such distinction below. 119 See generally id. at 46. 120 See generally id. 121 See id. at 44. 122 Thus from a pro-paternalist standpoint, it has recently been argued that autonomy, at least as understood by the writer, is "not all that valuable; not valuable enough to offset what we lose by leaving people to their own autonomous choices." SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 1 (2013).
III. PATERNALISM AND THE INCREASING BLURRINESS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SELF-AND OTHER-REGARDING ACTIONS
Some distinction between actions that harm the actor and those that harm other non-consenting persons is fundamental to legal paternalism. This distinction underlies the classically expressed belief that "[t]he free man owns himself. He can damage himself with either eating or drinking; he can ruin himself with gambling. If . . . he may not, he is not a free man any more than a dog." 123 The classic attempt at this distinction is that of John Stuart Mill.
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Mill's formulations of the distinction vary throughout On Liberty, 125 but he recognizes at several points that any such distinction will, from a utilitarian standpoint, 126 sometimes be difficult. 127 We will leave unresolved whether any refinements and qualifications ultimately allow us to redeem the initial difficulties of the distinction 128 because our focus is instead on the gradually increasing difficulties of applying this crucial distinction in practice. . 124 See JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE 90 (2d ed., 1996) ("Hence, all discussion about paternalism is logically or conceptually parasitic on the possibility of making a distinction analogous to that which Mill wishes to make between self-regarding and other-regarding actions."). Mill himself attempts such a distinction in various formulations. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 89, at 70-73. 125 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 89, at 70-73, 147-51. See also C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 11 (1980) ("Mill readily and explicitly admits that self-regarding conduct affects others, and this admission is fatal to the traditional interpretation."). 126 See MILL, supra note 89, at 77. 127 See id. at 151. Mill therein seeks, apparently on a utilitarian basis, to distinguish acts that directly, versus only indirectly, affect other people, while recognizing that "whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself . . . ." 128 A leading contemporary of Mill, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, argued simply that Mill "assumes that some acts regard the agent only, and that some regard other people. In fact, by far the most important part of our conduct regards both ourselves and others . . Particularly in the areas of health care law, health insurance and other forms of insurance, public health measures, transportation and the environment, and safety and well-being in general, our public and private systems of provision have, over time, intensified and expanded our collective dependencies. 129 The idealized individualism of Thoreau 130 and Emerson 131 in the years prior to On Liberty have increasingly given way to a more interconnected, even if stratified, law and culture. Consider, for example, the perspective taken by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities. . . . We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly." 132 Based on our historically evolving understanding, a person "can damage himself with either eating or drinking," 133 but the damage may then be considered as a covered pre-existing condition under the Affordable Care Act. 134 Typical health insurance coverage can therefore neither be denied nor increased in price on this basis, even if the health damage in question is classified as voluntarily risked or incurred. 135 Whatever refinements 136 of Mill's self-regarding versus other-regarding conduct distinction we adopt, the distinction becomes increasingly blurry and elusive. The increasing blurriness, contestability, and dubiousness of this line in turn diminishes the scope of applicability of any broad, fundamental principle that allows for or rejects paternalism.
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The increased blurring of any line between self-and other-regarding actions is manifested in other legal subject-matter areas as well. For example, there may once have been something of a legal consensus that the private consumption of pornography produced by and for consenting adults counted as a largely self-regarding activity, despite its harms. At this point, however, any such legal consensus is under increasing attack from various perspectives.
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Similar stories of increasingly blurry distinctions could be told about negative externalities associated with prostitution between adults, 139 individual vehicle fuel emissions, 140 particular quantities 135 See id.; see also Anthony N. DeMaria, The Nanny State and "Coercive Paternalism", 61 J. AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY 2108, 2109 (2013) ("There is no question that self-induced disease is common, largely preventable, and at the very least an economic burden to society."). 136 Attempting to distinguish primary or direct and immediate effects from secondary or indirect effects may well allow persons to claim that not all of contemporary civic life falls into the category of other-regarding actions, and thus outside the category of acts subject to paternalistic restriction. But the overall distinction has, in our society, become increasingly unclear. See In these and other contexts, appeals to any basic principles either for or against legal paternalism are thus becoming less meaningful and less credible. The various complications 145 and costs of policy alternatives, including their indirect and supposedly unanticipated consequences, correspondingly begin to loom larger. 146 But all of the policy complications arise in the context of the increasing lack of clarity over whether a given policy addresses self-regarding or 141 See also Sugar tax, supra note 10 (noting that "Norway taxes chocolate and sweets while Finland and France tax sweetened drinks."). The public policy prudence of imposing a tax on presumably heart-healthy dark chocolate could be contested. 142 See Weinbaum, supra note 9. 143 See, e.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F. other-regarding conduct, in whatever sense of this distinction we finally choose.
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Primary among these complications is that of the roles of individual, group, and official policy-making biases and pathologies in decision-making. Questions of the proper role of legal paternalism thus increasingly incorporate considerations of the decision-making biases of persons potentially subject to legal paternalism, as well as of those who might adopt or implement 148 paternalistic policies. We briefly survey several of these decision-making biases and pathologies immediately below.
IV. LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE PATHOLOGIES OF INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Whether to adopt any particular regulation involving legal paternalism increasingly incorporates a more or less careful assessment of the cognitive limitations and decision-making biases of the potentially regulated parties. 149 As of 1963, the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart referred to "a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best."
150 Any defectiveness in individual prudential choice, however, can only be part of the story. An important complication is that decision-making competence has not only a possible growth dimension, but a comparative dimension as 147 See de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, supra note 1146, at 94 (noting several areas in which supposedly paternalistic policies might be defensible on grounds of protecting minors or other unconsenting third parties). well. 151 Wisdom and prudence specifically in public or governmental decision making also cannot be taken for granted.
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As though anticipating Hart, Jeremy Bentham classically observed that "[i]t is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too little of himself. Be it so: but is it so certain that the legislator must know more?" 153 More recently, though, it has been argued in response that "even when subject to similar biases, experts are relatively better decisionmakers than laypeople." 154 As it turns out, issues of possible growth in competence, and of the relative competencies of regulators and paternalistically regulated parties, are crucial in assessing the overall value of any paternalistic intervention.
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The systematic cognitive and other biases of decisionmakers have of late generated substantial interest.
156 From the standpoint of legal paternalism, however, our increasingly detailed awareness of the importance of various decision-making biases is not entirely clear in its implications. For one thing, the various cognitive biases may impose costs not only on the individual decisionmaker, but on unconsenting third parties as well, 157 such that it may no longer be appropriate to think of the regulation in question as purely paternalistic. And for another, individual and group official policymakers 151 See generally Blumenthal, supra note 149, at 757 (explaining that in order to determine the propriety of paternalistic intervention, both the individuals' and the experts' respective decision-making abilities must be evaluated and compared). 152 See, e.g., id at 733-35 (discussing the benefits of decision-making by experts with substantive knowledge, skill or authority). 153 may also suffer from their own structural decision-making pathologies. 158 Merely as examples of the well-established catalog of decisionmaking biases, consider those involving systematic overoptimism; 159 problems with unreasonably discounting future events; 160 arbitrary framing effects; 161 anchoring our decisions on the basis of arbitrary numbers; 162 self-serving personal assessments, 163 including a typical failure to recognize our own incapacities; 164 a tendency to unreasonably confirm and reinforce our own prior judgments; 165 and grossly overgeneralizing from random events and from small and unrepresentative samples. 166 We tend to focus on mental images, rather than on actual quantities and magnitudes. 167 More generally,
[t]he explanatory stories that people find compelling are simple; are concrete rather than abstract; assign a larger role to talent, stupidity, and intentions than to luck; and focus on a few striking events that happened rather than on the countless events that failed to happen.
Beyond these basically uncontroversial decision-making biases, there are more contested but arguably important manifestations of systematic irrationality at the level of individual and group decisionmaking, as in theories of false consciousness 169 and of our inappropriate recourse to the various Freudian defense mechanisms.
170 Consider in particular whether adult decision-making, even as to legal policy, can ever be usefully thought of in terms such as denial, repression, regression, displacement, projection, identification, reaction formation, or rationalization. 171 Both private actors and governments are capable as well of varying degrees of the cognitive vices of self-delusion and self-indulgence.
172
Individual and group decision-making are thus commonly riddled with irrationalities of various sorts. If the harm of such irrationalities were largely confined to the actors in question, and to consenting parties, the case for paternalism would be broadly strengthened. 173 But here again, 174 it is increasingly difficult to determine whether any proposed response to individual irrationality should count as a form of paternalism, or else at least as importantly as an instance of protecting unconsenting third parties.
The most crucial complication, though, is that to one degree or another, the officials charged with deciding whether to impose some form of paternalistic regulation, and with implementing that regula- 173 Of course, we would even then have to factor in the harms and benefits to individual cognitive and character development over time, and to one's sense of responsibility and motivation to learn. 174 See supra Section IV.
tion, will themselves suffer from analogous biases, or else from biases and irrationalities more specific to officials and official decision-making bodies.
175
Thus, decisions about legal paternalism in practice are made and implemented at all stages by authorities who are to some degree or another subject to their own variety of systematic pathologies of decision-making. 176 Those authorities may also have their own public or private agendas, potentially in conflict with whatever we might imagine to be the proper role of legal paternalism. 177 Their decisions may reflect, directly or indirectly, what is known as monopoly rentseeking behavior and related pathologies. 178 While conformist groupthink 179 or swarm-mindedness can certainly afflict private individual decision-making, 180 the decision-making pathology of groupthink is most notorious in public decision-making contexts. 181 The overall priorities of regulators and regulated parties may also differ and conflict in relevant ways. James Q. Wilson argues in particular that "advocates of regulation tend to believe that motives and intentions are more important than results, and that implementation problems are matters of mere detail and goodwill." 182 Regulated parties may not fully share these sensibilities. More generally, Peter Schuck has argued that "[n]onmarket failure, like market failure, is a systematic, incentives-based tendency of government policies." 183 The point is not that legally paternalistic policies are likely to be designed and implemented either consistently well or consistently poorly. Rather, individual and private group decision-making pathologies are merely the first among the expanding complications involved in properly classifying government interventions as paternalistic or non-paternalistic in the first place, and then in assessing the merits of legally paternalistic interventions. At some point, and most typically in some complex, particularized context, some comparison of the relevant pathologies and biases of individual citizens and government actors must logically be made. This multidimensional comparison would somehow have to take into account matters of comparative magnitudes, probabilities, interactive effects, possible improvement, and the passage of time.
Thus, in this respect as well, debate over the scope of legal paternalism is decreasingly a matter of basic principles, and increasingly a matter of detailed, murky, contextualized, painstaking conceptual and empirical inquiries. Below, we briefly note several important additional dimensions of the latter sorts of inevitably murky conceptual and empirical considerations.
V. LEGAL PATERNALISM AND THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPLEX, DETAILED, CONTEXTUALIZED INQUIRY IN GENERAL
John Stuart Mill's classic discussion of freedom 184 and paternalism is explicitly intended to defend "one very simple principle" 185 regarding government intervention into private choices. In reality, though, as seems inevitable, Mill's account instead is widely recognized as far from simple.
186
To begin with, both private actors and potential legal regulators must typically consider, to the extent that it is reasonable to do so, matters such as the probability of one or more looming harms; the gravity of those harms in one combination or another; the probability of achieving one's goals, or something akin thereto; the various sorts and magnitudes of value of achieving those goals; the possibility of growth and maturity over time in decision-making and the value thereof, if any; the effectiveness with which any relevant messages and incentives are actually communicated; the value, if any, of purely symbolic or expressive legal paternalism; any dignitary or privacy considerations in any relevant sense of these terms; regulatory program costs in financial terms; the various costs of evasion; and the availability and value of alternative, to some degree less adult choice-making may result in both suppressing and promoting relevant competencies over the long term.
193
In addition, policymakers might well consider whether adopting paternalistic policies could lead, unintentionally, to a gradual widespread desensitization to some paternalistic practices that we now typically consider objectionable. The question of the existence of genuinely slippery slopes is itself multidimensional and largely contextual. It is not unimaginable that less than fully successful paternalistic interventions may often be replaced by a succession of increasingly restrictive interventions.
194 Such possibilities-as well as that of an eventual over-reactive backlash-amount to a further important, but complex, complication well beyond the realm of any basic principles.
Perhaps most important, though, are the complications that arise when we try to limit paternalism to promoting merely what the regulated party already genuinely seeks or values. The idea is roughly that such forms of paternalism can assist the regulated party in fulfilling that person's own pre-existing aims, if not their currently chosen means, and are likely to promote both autonomy and happiness. 195 There will indeed be some clear and unequivocal such cases, as when we forcibly prevent someone from casually wandering off a cliff, earning their immediate gratitude and ratification. not that our individual goals may not actually be promoted by the means we choose to pursue those goals. 198 Even in such cases, we sometimes ascribe intrinsic value to a chosen means, or to our ability to grow through making the choice, thereby blurring the distinction between means and ends.
199 Sometimes, the means we choose in seeking an end is itself of great value to us. 200 Rather, the crucial complication is that each of us genuinely seeks incompatible important goals. The idea that each individual values or pursues mutually inconsistent goals, often at a single given time, underlies some of our great literature, as well as arguments of many of the great humanists and philosophers. 201 Legal paternalists thus cannot claim to promote one of those goals, at the expense of another, by relying solely on our own clear preferences. Instead, paternalists must adopt some other rationale for privileging any one of our important goals at the expense of others; or so, at least, one could reasonably argue, thus creating a further crucial and typically contextualized complication. 234 (1977) , in which Professor Dworkin discusses the status of "external preferences." We might, for example, prefer some level of income or wealth for ourselves, while also holding a more or less sustained, intense, or somehow "deeper" preference for how income and wealth should be distributed at a broad societal level. Can a paternalist readily determine how a person really prioritizes these two kinds of preferences?
And finally, there are the various more specific complications more or less uniquely associated with each of the distinct subject matter areas that often involve legal paternalism. Merely for example, consider the arguably paternalistic 203 legal regulation of recreational or mood-altering drugs. 204 No basic abstract principle can allow us, for example, to predict how much legalization-or some form of decriminalization-of one or more such drugs will increase or decrease the consumption of any particular drug, or any associated social costs. 205 More specifically, no basic principle of either support for or rejection of legal paternalism can even begin to clarify the price elasticity of demand, under various circumstances, for a particular drug; the status of a drug as what is technically known as an inferior or superior economic good; the degree of competitiveness of future supply markets for the drug; the effects on any related crimes of fraud or violence; possible regimes of sales and excise taxes; the collection, and any systematic evasion, of such taxes; the real value of any purposes to which such additional tax revenues are put; the costs and benefits of any legally mandated strengths or quality control measures and the evasion of such regulations; issues of civil or criminal liability for breaches of regulations associated with decriminalization; any increased costs of rent-seeking efforts in the context of drug deregulation; interstate smuggling under different legal and tax regimes; the possibility of a net reduction in the costs of prosecuting drug related activities; and any effects, over time, on rates of impaired driving, and of drug addiction and costs of treatment.
206
Individually and cumulatively, these considerations are neither trivial nor obvious in their impact, let alone in their magnitude or moral weight. Increasingly, responsible discussion of anti-paternalistic drug decriminalization will inevitably focus on our best 203 As implied by Section IV, mood-altering drugs could be regulated entirely on either paternalistic or non-paternalistic grounds, or on a mixture thereof. 204 A further complication is that we might want to vary the degree of paternalism according not only to the particular drug, but to the particular circumstances of use as well. 205 guesses, slowly accumulating experiences, and on detailed, technical arguments as to the above sorts of considerations, rather than on the more or less mechanical application of any broad paternalist or anti-paternalist principles.
VI. THE ECLIPSE OF PRINCIPLE IN THE GLUCKSBERG ASSISTED SUICIDE CASE
Each of the basic themes explored above can be illustrated in the evolving national and international debate over arguably paternalistic restrictions on the legal availability of assisted suicide. The number of thoughtful discussions regarding the law and morality of assisted suicide and of voluntary euthanasia is quite substantial, 207 with concerns for paternalism and autonomy often being central thereto. 208 In some instances, paternalism may underlie not only the legally binding rules and the judgments of hospitals and physicians, but the private decisions of families 209 and even of the patients themselves. 210 The family of a person contemplating assisted suicide may thus seek to paternalistically override the admittedly competently arrived at preferences of that person.
211 And a person might choose for or against assisted suicide based partly on the perhaps paternalistic belief that the family does not recognize or cannot promote its own long-term interests.
212 Again, our purpose herein is not to take sides on any normative issue, but to emphasize the diminishing value in our day of broadly principled stances for or against legal paternalism.
To the extent that suicide, and assisted suicide in particular, affect non-consenting third parties, the most valuable debate must focus in part on boundary line questions, along with various other particularized and contextualized questions. 213 As suggested above, some assisted suicide cases will involve mixtures of several distinct motives. 214 Such motives may include a desire to shape, to some degree, the basic structure of one's life; 215 a possible sense of pointlessness, alienation, futility, moral obligation, responsibility, social benevolence, nihilism, isolation, hopelessness, or anomie; a concern for dignity in the sense of an anticipated, or feared, personally, or socially, perceived humiliation; a deep cultural or religious commitment to a morality of honor and disgrace, or of personal independence; 216 one's metaphysical commitments and attitudes toward pain or suffering; and a desire to promote the interests of one's family.
Not all such motives may justify legal paternalism to an equal degree. 217 The major American case addressing physician assisted suicide is Washington v. Glucksberg. 218 While it is doubtless tempting to think of the Glucksberg case as a broad showdown between advocates of a generalized constitutional right to personal autonomy 219 and advocates of the federal constitutional permissibility of statelevel medical paternalism, the essence of the case is really found in the aggregate of its various lower-level, contextualized, more specific complications.
The Glucksberg Court was crucially concerned, for example, with several narrower gauge issues such as the scope and boundaries transformed into what amounts to a contextualized duty to die, or into an instrument of discrimination.
229
On the other hand, a right to assisted suicide might be expanded if what is thought to constitute a "terminal" illness is thought to be often too complex or contestable. 230 We might then wish to err on the side of rights-protection by eliminating any requirement that the illness be terminable.
More broadly, the relevance of highly contextualized "slippery slope" arguments bearing specifically upon assisted suicide must then inevitably be somehow addressed. 231 The slipperiness of any particular slope regarding, for example, an initial legal requirement that there be a terminal and not merely a chronic or acute illness, or of unrelieved suffering or physical pain, or of any physician involvement at one stage or another, would all require attention at some point. 232 Even if we perceived a slippery slope toward fewer restrictions on assisted suicide in, we would have to decide whether we would still object to ending up at the bottom of the particular slippery slope by the time we actually arrived there.
Even more subtly, the various issues associated with possible professional role stress for the health professionals involved, as well as any possible fear on the part of the patient, of judgmentalism, of a bureaucratic mentality, or of shifting realistic interests and loyalties on the part of the most directly involved health care professionals, must be somehow addressed. 233 It is certainly possible to argue that professional role stress in such cases will either be minimal or else largely confined merely to a transitional generation of health care professionals. Again, though, our point herein is not to take sides on any such questions, but to emphasize the increasing importance in the assisted suicide contexts of many such relatively narrow-gauge, complex, circumstantial, partly empirical issues, rather 229 See id. 230 See id. at 733; see also id. at 752-54 (Souter, J., concurring). Such determinations would crucially depend upon choosing some more or less arbitrary time frame, and some particular degree of tolerance for what we imagine to be any errors in prognosis. than any broad principles. 234 This theme recurs throughout any discussion of the proper contemporary role of legal paternalism in general.
CONCLUSION
We commonly think of debates over the proper role of legal paternalism as largely focused on issues of basic principles. This Article has, to the contrary, called attention to the developing eclipse of broad or basic principle in matters of legal paternalism.
In part, this eclipse of principle is due to the increasing variety of distinct understandings of both legal paternalism and of the idea of autonomy, to which legal paternalism increasingly bears a contested and complex relationship.
Beyond this development, there is a rapidly increasing skepticism toward the view of autonomy that would afford the most ambitious foundation for broadly rejecting paternalism at a fundamental level-that of full Kantian-style autonomy. To the extent that full Kantian autonomy loses credibility, the argumentative focus naturally shifts toward various narrower, more contextualized, detailed, and complex issues and claims.
As well, all forms of the classic distinction emphasized by John Stuart Mill between actions that can somehow be regarded as selfregarding, and actions that can be considered to be other-regarding, as a ground for a broadly principled approach to legal paternalism, are in our culture increasingly dubious. In various respects, persons are today more intensively interrelated and crucially interdependent, and even inseparable, than would have typically been the case in Mill's day.
We are also increasingly recognizing the crucial role of various cognitive biases, pathologies, and systematic irrationalities involved in individual decision-making. A crucial complication, though, is that we also increasingly recognize either similar or different such systematic biases in the adoption and implementation of legally paternalistic and other government policies. Remarkably multidimensional problems of comparative biases and pathologies as among private and public actors thus loom larger in discussions of legal paternalism.
Finally, this Article has gathered a number of more contextualized, but important, problems illustrating the increasing significance of various narrow-gauge, multidimensional, circumstance-based, particularized inquiries into concepts and evidence, as distinct from basic principle. A number of these trends are on display, in concrete fashion, in the context of the Glucksberg assisted suicide case. Such relatively detailed considerations, however, promise to loom increasingly large in discussions of the proper role and limits of legal paternalism in any context.
